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Introduction  
This article focuses on mediation case law that has arisen in recent years across two distinct 
jurisdictions within the UK, namely: England & Wales; and Scotland.  Since the Act of Union in 1707, 
the legal system in Scotland has remained separate and distinct from that in England & Wales, albeit 
that over the years there has been significant harmonisation of law through UK parliamentary 
legislation and also, to a lesser extent, by dint of the appeal court function of the Judicial Committee 
of the House of Lords (now UK Supreme Court).  That said, many areas of common law – and statute2 
– are founded upon different principles and espouse differing rules across the two jurisdictions.  The 
law relative to mediation is no different where both commonalities and divergences across the divide 
can be found.  The court system in Scotland is also distinct from its southern neighbours, leading to 
different procedural rules – provisions within which the promotion of mediation as a court-connected 
activity may be found.  As a general point it can be said that the law pertaining to mediation across 
both England & Wales and Scotland can be classified as both the law of mediation (that is specific legal 
rules that were crafted for mediation practice) and the law in mediation (general legal concepts that 
have application in the context of mediation)3.   
 
Mediation case law 
Prior to analysing some of the main case law that subsists as regards mediation, as  a general point, 
the reader should note that the balance of judicial decisions set out below is not in any way even in 
coverage across Scotland and England & Wales respectively.  That this is so is down to two principal 
reasons.  On the one hand, the development of mediation in England & Wales can be seen as at a 
more mature stage than that in its northern neighbour.  Scotland received mediation slightly later 
than England & Wales and the process has been slower to take hold, not least because of the more 
limited linking between courts and mediation that that has occurred north of the border4.  Secondly, 
England & Wales simply dwarfs Scotland in terms of sheer scale with a population more than 10 times 
the size and a resultant, proportionately higher volume of litigation producing case judgements on 
different facets of mediation.  It should hence be noted that judicial decisions in respect of mediation 
in Scotland are rare beasts indeed.  Where appropriate the article will discuss the likelihood that 
Scottish courts may follow the decisions of their English counterparts.   
The areas of case law that this article focuses on are as follows: recourse to mediation through 
mandatory means or other pressures to mediate; confidentiality and evidential privilege in mediation; 
the enforceability of mediation clauses; and liability of mediators and legal advisers in respect of 
mediation. 
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 Mandatory mediation and pressures to mediate 
It is generally said (in theory at least) that compulsory mediation is not found in the English 
jurisdiction5, although there are a range of views as to whether the practice is legitimate in law or 
indeed for that matter desirable.6   English judges in early court decisions flirted with the notion of 
mandatory mediation.  For example, in Shokusan v Danovo7 it was viewed by Blackbourne J. that a 
court had the power to order mediation even if one party was unwilling to take part8.  This journey 
into compulsion was stopped in its tracks, however, by the seminal Court of Appeal decision in Halsley 
v Milton Keynes Trust NHS9 In which Dyson, LJ held that compulsory referral by a court to mediation 
was in violation of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Dyson, LJ’s view was based 
on his interpretation of a decision by the European Court on Human Rights in Deweer v Belgium10  
where it was held that in circumstances in which a shopkeeper alleged to have infringed pricing laws 
was offered the chance to make payment in a ‘friendly settlement’ rather than going to trial, this 
amounted to an infringement of Article 6(1).  Although technically Dyson, LJ’s view can be seen as 
merely an obiter11 proposition, Halsley left an indelible imprint on the field as regards compulsory 
mediation.12  It is worth noting that the view expressed in Halsley regarding mandatory mediation was 
subsequently attacked by a range of commentators13, on the basis that reference to mediation with 
no obligation to settle within the process would not per se amount to an infringement of Article 6.  
This view has since gathered support from the decision of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in 
Alassini14in which a mandatory mediation programme was held not to infringe Article 6 ECHR in so are 
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as it did not result in decisions binding against the parties, or is subject to excessive delay or cost.15  
Equally the EU Directive on mediation itself supported the notion of mandatory mediation.16 
Despite the judicial eschewing of mandatory mediation, courts have resorted to other methods by 
which parties’ arms may be twisted into attempting mediation.  Although the English courts generally 
subscribe to the ‘loser pays’ principle in the apportionment of costs, the conduct of litigating parties 
may dictate a departure from the normal rules.  In this sense, the bulk of more recent case law in 
England and Wales pertains to operation of rules that exert pressure on parties to mediate by way of 
cost penalties that might be imposed on those who ‘unreasonably refuse’ to have resorted to 
mediation.  A voluminous amount of case law has arisen in this area.  As a general point, it should be 
noted that the jurisprudence here is not especially consistent.   
One of the first cases to deal with this issue was Dunnet v Railtrack.17  This case involved an appeal 
made against a failed compensation claim against Railtrack.  Although the appellant subsequently lost 
the appeal, the Court of Appeal did not award Railtrack it costs in relation to the appeal because it had 
failed to follow a judicial recommendation to attempt to resolve the dispute by mediation.   
After a series of further cases,18 the broad guidelines governing the circumstances in which a party 
may be deemed to have unreasonably refused to mediate were formulated authoritatively in 
Halsley.19 The Court of Appeal stated that for a cost penalty to be applied against a winning party, the 
unsuccessful party would have to prove that mediation had been unreasonably refused by their 
opponent. In terms of the factors that should be taken into account when determining if a refusal to 
mediate was unreasonable or not, the court set out the following (non-exhaustive) factors:  
(1) the nature of the dispute; 
(2) the merits of the case; 
(3) whether previous attempts had been made to settle the claim; 
(4) whether the costs of ADR would be disproportionately high; 
(5) whether an ADR process would delay the proceedings; 
(6) the prospects of success of such a process; and 
(7) whether the court had encouraged use of ADR.20 
 
This area of law is one that can be seen to have been in state of flux over the years.  By the beginning 
of the current decade, the judicial environment arguably seemed to be one in which costs sanctions 
amounted to compulsion ‘by the back door’, or what Ahmed has termed, “implied compulsory 
mediation”21 The high watermark of this notion could be found in a range of decisions in the early part 
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of the current decade - the combined effect of which may have struck fear into the hearts of the most 
hardened litigators.  In PGF II SA v OMFS Co22, for example, it was held that a party’s refusal to respond 
to an offer of mediation from the other side itself amounted to unreasonable behaviour and led to 
liability in terms of costs sanctions. Similarly in Rolf De Guerin23, Rix LJ in a stringent pro-mediation 
judgement stated that ‘spurned offers to enter into settlement negotiations or mediation were 
unreasonable’. Consequently, in Garritt-Critchley and others v Ronnan and another,24 a refusal to 
mediate on the grounds that the defendant believed that the parties could not be reconciled was held 
to unreasonable.  Furthermore, in Thacker v Patel25, a costs order requiring defendants who had 
dragged their feet in agreeing to implement mediation, to pay 75% of the claimants’ costs was upheld 
on appeal.  Nonetheless, swimming against the tide of this pro-mediation case law, a more recent 
Appeal Court decision has reiterated that there remain cases when it will be right and proper to refuse 
to mediate.  In Gore v Naheed and Ahmed26the Court of Appeal allowed the successful claimant his 
costs despite the fact that he had refused an offer to mediate made by the defendant.  Delivering the 
leading judgement, Patten LJ arguably departed from previous approaches in three ways: first, by 
gauging the reasonableness of an refusal to mediate by reference to the success of an action he noted 
that he had “difficulty in accepting that the desire of a party to have his rights determined by a court 
of law in preference to mediation can be said to be unreasonable conduct particularly when, as here, 
those rights are ultimately vindicated.” Secondly, Patten LJ placed a greater emphasis on the 
discretionary nature of the adverse costs order than hitherto could be found, remarking that even in 
a case of an unreasonable refusal to mediate the court did not require to penalise a party as to costs.  
Finally, he noted with approval comments made by the trial judge in the case that the complex nature 
of the legal issues involved in the case made it unsuitable for mediation.   
Scotland  
By contrast to the morass of decisions in this area in England & Wales at present the Scottish landscape 
is somewhat barren as regards case law.   Unlike their English counterparts, Scottish judges have not 
developed general rules to direct parties into mediation on pain of adverse costs orders,27 although 
there do exist common law precepts as they pertain to the power of judges to vary awarding 
expenses28 at the end of proof29 which would arguably encompass penalising parties who 
unreasonably refuse to mediate.30  No reported cases exist on this point at present, however, as 
regards financial penalties for a refusal to mediate.  Nonetheless, judicial decisions exist that suggest 
that refusal to mediate could give rise to expenses sanctions. So for example, where an action brought 
by successful pursue is deemed by the court to be unnecessary31 or when one party has failed to 
provide sufficient information so as to preclude the other party from making a settlement offer32, 
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expenses penalties may be granted.   Moreover, at the time of writing new court rules have bolstered 
the presence of mediation within Scottish civil justice33 and it may be that in the near future similar 
provisions as to those which apply in England & Wales regarding cost penalties begin to emerge 
through judicial innovation  in Scotland. 
Confidentiality and privilege in mediation   
Another especially active area in terms of case law in the UK is that of confidentiality and evidential 
privilege in mediation.  The main issues in the case law have concerned the extent that information 
tendered in and around mediation may be disclosed in consequent litigation as well as the 
compellability of mediators to give evidence in court.  Unlike the situation as regards cross border 
mediation where a bespoke legal regime implementing the terms of the EU Directive on Mediation 
applies,34 the rules regarding the application of confidentiality and privilege in respect of all domestic 
mediation in England & Wales are derived from common law principles.  There is no special privilege 
that exists at common law for mediators in England & Wales.35  Confidentiality can be sought through 
general contractual means36 and/or through operation of the general ‘without prejudice’ rules that 
apply to negotiations.  In relation to the effectiveness of contractual provisions against the 
admissibility in consequent litigation as to what occurred in a mediation or the compellability of 
mediators as witnesses, it is well settled that such mere contractual rights would not stand in the way 
of greater public policy interests in favour of the disclosure of evidence or compellability of 
witnesses.37 In this sense, in Farm Assist Ltd (In Liquidation) v The Secretary of State for the 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (No2),38  Ramsey J held that the parties’ own agreement as to 
confidentiality will not be the deciding factor in whether information received during a mediation will 
in fact be considered confidential.39   
The more important rules in practice then, and those that have generally come before the courts in 
the context of determining the extent that mediation  proceedings can be opened up to scrutiny, are 
the without prejudice rules.  Essentially, without prejudice rules protect statements made in the 
pursuance of a negotiated settlement from subsequent disclosure in litigation.  The premise behind 
the without prejudice rules as they apply to negotiations is to further the policy of encouraging 
settlement through providing the confidentiality necessary to promote candour in discussions.     As 
set out by Oliver LJ in Cutts v Head,40 ‘parties should be encouraged as far as possible to settle their 
disputes without resort to litigation and should not be discouraged by the knowledge that anything 
that is said in the course of such negotiations could be used to their prejudice in the course of the 
proceedings’.41  There are a range of recognised exceptions to the rule, however, including 
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unequivocal admissions or statements made42 or where fraud, impropriety or misrepresentations in 
the negotiations are alleged.43   
The English case law analysing the interaction between mediation and operation of the without 
prejudice rules is voluminous.  As a starting point, it is clear from the decision in Rush and Tompkins 
Ltd v Greater London Council,44 that the without prejudice rules will be applicable in mediation as a 
matter of public policy in terms of encouraging parties to settle disputes without litigation,45 thus 
confirming the principle outlined in Cutts v Head, above.  One must not conflate, however, everything 
that may have been disclosed in a mediation with statements made in a genuine attempt to resolve a 
dispute.  Despite what may be believed by mediating parties, only the latter are subject to the without 
prejudice privilege.  It was made clear in Rush that the question of whether disclosures will actually 
be considered without prejudice rests not on the assertions of the parties, but instead on the 
consideration of whether the particular disclosures were made in a genuine attempt to reach a 
settlement, rather than mere disclosures which happened to be made during the process of a 
mediation.46 
Moreover, the general exceptions operating in respect of without prejudice negotiations discussed 
above can also be found in the mediation context which may undermine parties’ confidence in the 
integrity of the process.  These caveats, as they pertain to mediation, were set out most prominently 
in Unilever v Proctor and Gamble47 where Robert Walker LJ held that where there is doubt over 
whether an agreement has been reached, disclosure is permissible.48 Disclosure may also occur in 
cases of misrepresentation, fraud, undue influence,49 estoppel50 or where there has been 
‘unambiguous impropriety’.51  Disclosures may also be made to explain delay,52 to provide evidence 
as to whether a ‘claimant has acted reasonably as to his loss in conduct’53 or in making an assessment 
of costs.54 
A range of recent cases in England have shown the limits to operation of confidentiality and privilege 
in the English context and the uncertainty that remains in determining exactly when courts will lift the 
lid on what has occurred in mediation sessions.  In Earl of Malmesbury v Strutt and Parker55 in which 
both parties waived their privilege as to confidentiality as to what had occurred in the mediation, it 
was held by the court that where a party acted in an unreasonable fashion in the mediation, evidence 
may be adduced to that effect leading to that party being penalised in respect of their costs.  In Farm 
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Assist Limited (in liquidation) v The Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural affairs (No. 2)56, 
again where both parties waived their privilege, in a case of a settlement agreed under alleged duress, 
the mediator was compelled to give evidence as to the conduct of the parties at the mediation despite 
a non-compellability clause in the mediation contract.  In Cattley v Pollard57 parties to mediation were 
ordered to disclose to the court certain documents furnished in the course of mediation discussions 
to allow the court to assess the level of damages in a subsequent case.  Finally, in Brown v Patel58 
despite the existence of a confidentiality provision, the court allowed evidence of parties’ conduct at 
a mediation to ascertain if the case had settled or not.   
The issue of whether documents produced by experts for use in a mediation were privileged was 
examined in Aird v Prime Meridian.59 The mediation which concerned a dispute over the construction 
of a house was not successful, and upon the recommencement of proceedings, the defendants sought 
to include the joint statements of experts which had been used as part of the mediation.60 The 
claimants asserted that such statements were covered by privilege as part of the confidential nature 
of mediation, and were thus inadmissible.61 At first instance, it was held that the expert statements 
were privileged for all purposes notwithstanding the fact that they were produced pursuant to Rule 
35.12(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules.62  However, reversing the decision in the Court of Appeal,63 May 
LJ observed that where documents ‘were obviously produced for other purposes, which were needed 
for and produced at the mediation’,64 confidentiality would not apply.  This case is illustrative of the 
difficulties that can arise when mediation is comingled with ongoing litigation processes. 
The courts have also recently addressed the exception to without prejudice privilege in mediation 
arising from the unambiguous impropriety of one of the parties.  In Ferster v Ferster65 the Court of 
Appeal upheld the decision at first instance and found that a settlement offer constituted 
‘unambiguous impropriety’ when it included a threat which amounted to blackmail and as such was 
not protected by without prejudice privilege.  The offer for settlement in this case tendered by the 
respondents (through the hands of the mediator) in an unfair prejudice petition66 stipulated that if it 
were not accepted they would instigate criminal proceedings against the petitioner, ruin his 
reputation and ensure that he could not operate in the online business industry again.  Moreover, 
threats were also made to the petitioner’s partner, who was not a party to the action.  The court 
consequently held that because of the nature of the threats, the without prejudice privilege that 
would otherwise have attached to the contents of the offer was waived and the terms of the offer 
could be led in evidence in support of the petitioner’s unfair prejudice case. 
Scotland 
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Akin to many other areas of mediation law in Scotland there is a dearth of case law as regards 
confidentiality and privilege in mediation.  Scotland mirrors England & Wales in that it there is no 
general mediation privilege as regards domestic mediation.67  So again the confidentiality as to what 
occurred in a mediation in any consequent litigation is broadly governed by the without prejudice 
rules as they apply to genuine attempts to settle the dispute made in a mediation. The general without 
prejudice rules are recognised in Scotland in a similar fashion to England and Wales.  In Scotland, it is 
well understood that communications made between parties in attempts to settle disputes are 
generally privileged and cannot be founded upon as evidence in any subsequent court actions68.  In 
line with its southern neighbours, the provisions of the European Directive as they have been brought 
into Scottish law only apply to cross border disputes.69   
By contrast, however, Scotland does benefit from bespoke statutory provisions governing 
confidentiality and privilege that apply to family mediation.70   This Act applies to all types of family 
mediation71  but only with regard to mediation conducted “by a person accredited as a mediator in 
family mediation to an organisation which is concerned with such mediation and which is approved 
for the purposes of this Act by the Lord President of the Court of Session”.72 The central premise of 
the Act is encapsulated in s 1(1) which holds that “no information as to what occurred during the 
family mediation to which this Act applies shall be admissible as evidence in any civil proceedings”. 
Any reference to what occurred during family mediation includes a reference to what was said, written 
or observed during such mediation.73  .  In terms of the exceptions to the general rule regarding non 
admissibility, aside from particular caveats that apply to consequent child protection proceedings, 
further exceptions bear significant similarly with those that might arise under operation of without 
prejudice rules.  They include evidence as to the existence or otherwise of any agreement reached in 
mediation; in the event of any challenge to a contract forged in mediation, information as to the 
contract that relates to this challenge; information as to what occurred in the mediation if all parties 
(but not necessarily the mediator) agree to this effect; information arising where proceedings are 
raised against the mediator or any party at the mediation in respect of damage to property or personal 
injury allegedly carried out by that person; or information arising out of proceedings arising from the 
mediation to which the mediator is a party.74   
One notable recent case exemplifies the uncertainties that can arise in respect of the exception which 
pertains to the establishing the existence or otherwise of agreements forged in mediation.   FJM v 
GMC75 involved a married couple with two children who had lived in Australia until their separation.  
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The father petitioned the court under the provisions of the Hague Convention on Abduction that his 
spouse had unlawfully removed their children to Scotland76.  The wife accepted that she had 
contravened the terms of the Convention but argued that the petitioner had acquiesced in their 
removal.  More importantly for our purposes, although the mediation could not have been said to 
have settled all issues between the parties, she argued that he had agreed in their discussions in 
mediation that the children could remain in Scotland and that he would not invoke his rights seeking 
the return of the children under the Convention.  The father claimed that any such information 
disclosed in the mediation was not admissible in any subsequent court proceedings by way of s 1 of 
the Civil Mediation Evidence Act.  The petitioner’s case fell at the first hurdle as the court held that 
the Act did not in fact apply to cross border Hague Convention disputes of this nature77.  Although not 
germane to the decision in the case, Lord Stewart then proceeded to remark obiter that even if the 
legislation did apply it was unlikely that the statements of the petitioner would have been protected 
given that one of the recognised exceptions in the Act related to “evidence as to the existence or 
otherwise of any agreement reached in mediation.”78   The statements regarding the agreement of 
the petitioner in this sense were recorded in series of emails between the mediator and the parties 
and in this case recorded in a note of the outcomes by the mediator.79  This case then highlights the 
uncertainties that can arise in respect of agreements that might be made by the parties in a complex 
mediation regarding a range of issues presented that may be disclosed in consequent litigation.  
 
Enforcement of mediation clauses 
Another relatively active area of case-law that bears examination pertains to the enforcement of 
contractual agreements to mediate.  By virtue of such clauses in commercial contracts parties may 
agree to first attempt to resolve a dispute by mediation prior to proceeding to the adjudicative means 
of arbitration or litigation.  For some time, however, it was doubted that such clauses were in practice 
enforceable in the UK.  This view stems from the common law principle that agreements to negotiate80 
are themselves unenforceable for want of certainty.81  For England & Wales, the enforceability of 
mediation clauses was first affirmed, however, in the seminal case of Cable and Wireless v IBM United 
Kingdom Ltd82 in which a defined mediation process set out in the clause, establishing how the 
mediator was to be selected and paid for, could be distinguished from mere negotiations.  In this vein, 
the court viewed that “[the mediation clause in question] includes a sufficiently defined mutual 
obligation upon the parties both to go through the process of initiating a mediation, selecting a 
mediator and at least presenting that mediator with its case and its documents and attending upon 
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him.  There can be no serious difficulty in determining whether a party has complied with such 
requirements”.83 
The importance of drafting clearly defined processes for mediation if contractual provisions are to be 
enforceable is exemplified in later case law.  In the case of Balfour Beatty Construction Northern Ltd v 
Modus Corovest (Blackpool) Ltd84 the relevant mediation clause was, inter alia, held to be 
unenforceable for want of precision.  The clause in question, which made provision for a period of 
time to allow a party to agree to consider whether the case would be suitable for mediation, was held 
to be no more than an agreement to agree and hence unenforceable.  Similarly in In WAH (aka Alan 
Tang) v Grant Thornton International Limited85 the court refused to uphold a clause providing for 
conciliation as a precursor to arbitration on the basis that the process as set out was ‘equivocal’ and 
‘nebulous’ and concluded that it could not therefore be an enforceable condition preventing either 
side from commencing relevant arbitration procedures.  The Wah case arguably sets out a high 
watermark in terms of the precision with which a clause must be drafted so as to render it enforceable.  
The court in Wah noted that for the provision to be enforceable a clause should amount to a 
sufficiently certain and unequivocal commitment to commence a process; b) set out, with sufficient 
clarity, what steps each party is required to take to put the process in place; c) articulate a sufficiently 
clear and defined process to enable the Court to determine objectively: i. what, under that process, is 
the minimum required of the parties to the dispute in terms of their participation in it; and ii. when or 
how the process will be exhausted or properly terminable without breach.  
 The law is not entirely settled, however, and courts in other cases have taken more liberal approaches 
to enforceability.  This can be seen most notably in Emirates Trading Agency Llc v Prime Mineral 
Exports Private Ltd86  in which a multi-tiered dispute resolution clause was found to be enforceable 
which required to parties to resort to as seemingly a nebulous concept of ‘friendly discussions’ before 
either side could invoke arbitration.  In view of the need for clarity, it has been suggested that it is 
prudent drafting practice to ensure that any mediation clause should articulate how the mediator 
should be selected; how the mediator will be remunerated; the process to be followed in mediation, 
including reference to applicable rules; and indicating when the process will come to an end.87  
Beyond the issue of clarity in drafting, there are other matters that may serve to limit the 
enforceability of mediation clauses in practice.  In the family law case of Mann v Mann88 the court 
viewed that the power to enforce the clause by the court was discretionary and that in particular the 
court would need to be mindful of its obligations to allow due legal process.  The issues arising in this 
case are somewhat distinct from those involving mediation clauses in commercial contracts, however.  
In this instance a husband had failed to make payments to his wife agreed under a Court of Appeal 
mediation scheme.  The wife issued a statutory demand in respect of the payment but henceforth 
agreed to suspend this action to allow the matter to be resolved by further mediation.  The mediation 
subsequently did not take place with both parties blaming the other for the non-occurrence.  At a later 
date the wife issued her application to enforce the debt which the husband opposed on the basis of 
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her prior agreement to mediate.  The court stated that although the agreement to mediate was a valid 
one (in that it met the strict criteria for precision as set out in Wah) and hence prima facie binding 
upon the parties, nonetheless “it is clear that the agreement cannot be given effect so as to prevent 
the wife from applying for enforcement until and unless mediation has taken place. A bar of that 
nature would operate as a restriction on the right to apply to the court.”89 
Scotland 
There are no reported Scottish cases at present but the general approaches set out above are likely 
to be followed. 
Mediator liability  
There are no known successful legal claims against mediators in either England & Wales or Scotland.  
It is possible that an action could be brought against a mediator in negligence, breach of fiduciary duty 
or breach of contract arising from any errors or impropriety by a mediator which results in a loss to a 
mediating party. Standard mediator agreements may seek to exclude such liability although these 
kinds of contracts are likely to be seen as ‘standard form’ contracts under the terms of the Unfair 
Contracts Act 1977 and hence any such exclusions would require to be ‘fair and reasonable’ if they 
were to be rendered enforceable.90  Additionally, as a matter of contractual interpretation, any 
exclusion clause expressed in general terms might, depending on the facts and circumstances of the 
case, be held by the court not to provide the mediator from the consequences of his own negligence, 
and as a matter of public policy is most unlikely to protect the mediator from the consequences of his 
own deliberate wrongdoing.91  So far as the species of liability which might arise are concerned, a 
mediator may be found, for example, to have breached contractual confidentiality, exhibited bias, 
provided erroneous advice to parties, or drafted an agreement which does not give effect to the 
intention of the parties.92   
Liability of lawyers in and around mediation 
Given the professional responsibility of lawyers to serve the best interests of their clients and meet 
established professional standards93, it is possible for lawyers to incur liability in and around 
mediation.  Although there is a paucity of case law at present in either England & Wales or Scotland it 
seems at least possible that lawyers could become liable for failure to inform parties about mediation 
or promote its use, inadequate professional advice tendered within a mediation or in respect of the 
drafting of agreements forged within the mediation session.  There is one reported English case on 
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this latter point in which the solicitors subject to the action were not held liable by the court.  In Frost 
v Wake Smith &Tofields,94a case which concerned a family business dispute, a mediation was held that 
ultimately resulted in an agreement between the parties.  This agreement was subsequently written 
up in a contractual form by the defendant solicitors.  The Court of Appeal held that the solicitors were 
not liable for professional negligence even though they had captured the agreement in such a way as 
to render it legally enforceable.  In this particular case the court observed that the parties themselves 
had not crafted an agreement complete enough to be legally enforceable and that it was not the role 
of solicitors to fill the gaps.  Given the heavy involvement of lawyers in mediation in the UK, as the 
process progresses within both jurisdictions it can be expected that this area of litigation will develop. 
Conclusion   
As mediation has become more entrenched in the UK over recent years the volume of case law arising 
from different facets of its operation has increased.  It is one of mediation’s great ironies that although 
it is concerned with eschewing adjudicative decisions in courts, the process has spawned a wide range 
of satellite litigation.  As noted in this article, the vast majority of case law has thus far arisen in the 
England & Wales jurisdiction rather than Scotland and this largely reflects the greater use of the 
process south of the border and the more established bonds forged between mediation and the 
courts.  In the aftermath of recent reforms to the Scottish civil justice system which has placed more 
emphasis upon the use of mediation within the civil court system95, we may be entering a new era, 
however, in which mediation becomes more established and case law arising from its use becomes 
more commonplace. 
 
                                                          
94 [2013] EWCA Civ 772  
95 Primarily through the Court Reform (Scotland) Act 2014 and in particular the new ‘simple procedure’ for 
small claims in Scotland that places mediation centre stage – see Act of Sederunt (Simple Procedure) 2016, 
Schedule 1. 
